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Abstract
Technology leaders protecting a technological headstart with a patent are
provided with a powerful legal measure to restrict market entry. We analyze
the impact of knowledge spillover on the decision to patent and the effect of
varying patent breadth on the threat of market entry. An empirical test of our
theoretical results suggests that (i) a large technological lead is protected by
a patent only in industries with high knowledge spillover, and that (ii) patent
breadth can mitigate the market entry threat.
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1. Introduction
A broad patent can deter market entry of competitors (see Yiannaka and Fulton,
2006). While this benefits the inventor, one backside of patenting is that com-
pulsory information disclosure causes knowledge spillover which benefit competi-
tors. This paper investigates whether a technological leader can build effective
market entry barriers through patenting his innovative technology. Empirical
surveys identified information disclosure as a major reason for firms to refrain
from patenting (see, e.g., Cohen et al., 2000). Thus, one tradeoff an inventor
faces is that between seeking patent protection to prevent market entry and
the drawback of knowledge disclosure. While entry deterrence is more effective,
the broader a patent is, disclosure costs are heterogenous across industries (see
Heger and Zaby, 2013).
Suppose a successful inventor can protect a new technology by a patent or
secrecy. In a market with vertically differentiated products he can produce a
marketable product embodying the new technology earlier than his rival due
to a technological headstart. Additionally a patent protects a given quality
range from the entry of the rival, at the same time weakening the headstart
through compulsory information disclosure. Theory predicts that the inventor
will patent his invention whenever his technological headstart is moderate and
that he will rather rely on secrecy whenever his technological headstart is high.
Our empirical analysis confirms that the propensity to patent increases with
the extent of technological leadership in industry sectors with high spillover.
Substantial knowledge spillover weaken the effectiveness of secrecy meaning that
patenting becomes the preferred protective measure: the backside of patenting
is less prominent as spillover occur in either case – patent or secrecy. Concerning
the effectiveness of patenting we find that the breadth of patent protection has
a detrimental effect on the market entry threat, meaning that broader patents
may lead to an increasing propensity to patent.
The data used combines information on innovative activity and on the com-
petitive environment of firms. It is drawn from the German contribution to the
Community Innovation Survey (CIS), the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP).
To determine the effect of varying patent breadth, the theoretical model imple-
ments different degrees of patent breadth. The empirical analysis implements
this by using a measure based on the International Patent Classification (IPC)
codes following Lerner (1994), and additionally a more traditional measure of
patent scope based on forward citations.
Many approaches to the economics of patents view a patent as sufficient
deterrent to market entry (see, e.g., Gilbert and Newbery, 1982, Reinganum,
1983), whereas more recent approaches come to the conclusion that firms use
patent thickets or fences to secure their monopoly power (see, e.g., Shapiro,
2001, Schneider, 2008). A different strand of literature argues that patents do
not create a monopoly, but rather affect product varieties as competitors invent
around a patent and are forced to differentiate further, the broader patent scope
is (see Klemperer, 1990, Waterson, 1990). We follow this latter view by assum-
ing that a patent does not deter market entry completely: a sufficient variation
of the patented product suffices to bypass the patent. Following Denicolo and
Zanchettin (2002) we interpret patent breadth as “leading breadth” in a setting
of vertically differentiated products. Increasing leading breadth increases the
time needed to invent around a patent. Hence, the possible entry of a competi-
tor is postponed further into the future reducing the market entry threat for the
innovator. One of the contributions of this paper is that we use a direct measure
for this subjective perception of the threat of market entry. Methodologically we
introduce an innovative measure of patent breadth refining Lerner’s approach
based on IPC codes (Lerner, 1994). Our main contributions are (i) the contain-
ment of the stylized fact that the greater the technological advance a leading
firm accomplishes, the higher is its propensity to patent: contrary to the “lit-
tle patents and big secrets”-result of Anton and Yao (2004), we find that firms
do patent big innovations but only in industries characterized by substantial
knowledge spillover, and (ii) patent breadth reduces the threat of market entry.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows.1 In section 2 we present a brief
version of the underlying theoretical model. Section 3.1 then states the model’s
predictions and presents their empirical implementation. The following section
3.2 describes the data set and sample definition whereas section 3.3 presents
variable definitions and descriptive statistics. Section 3.4 presents our empirical
results. Section 4 concludes.
2. The theoretical model
The model presented in this section is a sketch of the model presented in Zaby
(2009). In a setting of dynamic vertical product differentiation, a successful
inventor decides between a patent or secrecy in order to protect his invention,
before determining the timing of his market entry. The decisions of the inventor
are modeled in a three stage game.
On the first stage, the inventor – denoted by subscript i – chooses how to
protect his discovery: either by a patent or secrecy. On the second stage, the
inventor and a competitor, firm j, choose whether to market a product of low or
high quality given the inventor’s protection decision. On the third stage, firms
compete in prices. The game is solved by backward induction.
One crucial assumption of the model is the dynamic evolvement of product
quality. Following Dutta et al. (1995) and Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2001)
we assume that investing more time in research activities suffices to improve
the quality of the new technology over time. More precisely, the quality of the
invention, x, increases by one unit in every period, i.e., the time the inventor
needs in order to reach quality x is given by
ti(x) = x. (1)
The inventor has a technological headstart of γ over his rival meaning that
1The analyses presented here in some parts build on Alexandra Zaby’s dissertation, see
Zaby (2010).
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the non-inventor needs to invest γ periods more than the inventor to reach the
same quality level, i.e., his research time is given by tj(x) = x+ γ.
Whenever the inventor patents, he loses his lead so that γ = 0.2 If the
inventor chooses secrecy to protect his invention, his intellectual property is not
perfectly appropriable. We measure knowledge spillover in the case of secrecy
by parameter λ and distinguish the initial headstart of the inventor, γ˜, from his
effective headstart, γ, which is defined by γ ≡ γ˜(1− λ). The non-inventor thus
profits from increasing knowledge spillover as his research time
tj(x) = x+ γ˜ − λγ˜ = x+ γ (2)
is shortened by λγ˜ for λ > 0.
2.1. Price competition
Subsequent to the protection decision on the first stage and the quality decisions
of the firms on the second stage of the game, firms compete in prices. During the
temporary monopoly the first adopter earns monopoly profits πm per period.
The entrance of the late adopter changes the market structure to an asymmetric
duopoly where the firm offering the lower quality, i.e., the first adopter, earns πl
per period and the firm offering the higher quality, i.e., the late adopter, realizes
profits πh per period, with πm > πh > πl.
The entry date of the early adopter is denoted by tl and that of the late
adopter by th. All future profits are discounted with the interest rate r > 0.
An early adopter’s overall profit consists of two parts: the monopoly profits
he realizes from his adoption in tl until the second firm enters in th and the
2Note that actually the impact of such a disclosure effect is subject to the implemented
patent law. While in Europe a statutory research use exemption exists which allows the use
of patented knowledge for research purposes, in other countries, such as the U.S. a statutory
research use exemption does not exist. In terms of the underlying theoretical model the lack











A late adopter earns duopoly profits πh per period starting with his entry







The quality choices of the inventor and his rival depend on the inventor’s pro-
tection decision on the first stage of the game meaning that the possible cases
secrecy and patent have to be distinguished. To avoid confusion, choice variables
will carry the superscript S if the inventor chooses secrecy and the superscript
P if he patents his invention.
On the second stage, the late adopter H has to decide when to adopt the
new technology after the early adopter L has already adopted the low quality xl.
Optimization of equation (4), with respect to the quality level xh yields the
optimum differentiation strategy given the early adopter’s quality decision, xl,




In deriving the optimum quality choices two possible scenarios can arise: in
scenario (I ), the inventor is the early adopter and in scenario (II ) the non-
inventor is the first adopter. It is shown in Zaby (2009) that the latter scenario
never prevails in equilibrium.
In scenario (I ) the respective research time functions are ti(xl) = xl and
tj(x
∗
h) = xl + 1/r + γ. Inserting the latter into equation (4) yields the overall
profits of the non-inventor, Hj(xl). The innovator as early adopter anticipates
this optimum differentiation strategy: inserting x∗h and tj(x
∗
h) into equation (3)
yields the overall profit of the inventor as early adopter, Li(xl). Optimization
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of Li(xl) with respect to xl then yields the profit maximizing adoption quality
for the inventor, x∗l .
Given that the non-inventor could reach a marketable quality level before
the inventor reaches x∗l , the non-inventor could preempt the inventor’s entry. In
the absence of patent protection this market entry threat forces the technology
leader to enter before x∗l is reached. This gives us
Result 1. If the inventor chooses to keep his invention secret, he adopts first
offering the low quality and the non-inventor is the late adopter offering the high
quality.
If the inventor chooses to patent his invention, a given range of quality levels,
which we denote as the breadth of the patent φ, is protected by the patent. As
a consequence the non-inventor can only enter the market with a quality that
exceeds the protected range. This positive effect of patenting is opposed by the
drawback that the inventor loses his technological lead due to the compulsory
disclosure of information leading to γ = 0. The inventor has an incentive to
patent in every situation where he is not able to adopt his profit maximizing
quality level, x∗l , due to the possibility of a preemptive market entry of his rival.
A patent mitigates this threat of entry as it protects a given range of product
space from entry what allows the inventor to postpone his entry long enough to
realize a higher product quality, xPi > x
S
i .
We distinguish three patent types: narrow patents, broad patents and de-
laying patents. Patents with breadth φ ∈ ]xSi , x
∗
i [ are defined as narrow patents
protecting the quality range up to φ. Patents with breadth φ ∈ [x∗i , x
∗
h[ are de-
fined as broad patents as they allow the inventor to reach his profit maximizing
quality x∗i . Both patent types modestly mitigate the threat of entry as they
still admit the non-inventor to follow his best differentiation strategy, x∗j > φ.
The strongest protectional degree is reached with delaying patents. They are
defined as patents with breadth φ ≥ x∗h and affect the differentiation strategy
of the non-inventor forcing him to postpone adoption into the future.
Given that the inventor patents his invention, three alternative unique Nash
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equilibria in the subgame patent exist, depending on the breadth of protection.
They are summarized in
Result 2. If the inventor chooses to patent his invention the subgame patent
has three alternative unique and stable Nash Equilibria.
(i) The perceived threat of entry is weakly mitigated with a narrow patent:
the inventor adopts quality φ and the non-inventor quality x∗j .
(ii) The perceived threat of entry is modestly mitigated with a broad patent:
the inventor adopts quality x∗i and the non-inventor quality x
∗
j .
(iii) The perceived threat of entry is strongly mitigated with a delaying patent:
the inventor adopts quality x∗i and the non-inventor is forced to wait until
he reaches the quality φ+ ǫ.
Thus, a patent reduces the threat of entry perceived by the inventor because it
broadens his possible quality choices. The extent of this effect is subject to the
breadth of a patent.
2.3. The patenting decision
On the first stage of the game, the inventor decides whether to patent or to keep
his invention secret. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the three stage
game can be derived by comparing the inventor’s alternative payoffs subject to
the chosen protection mechanism: he will choose to patent whenever this yields
higher profits than keeping the invention secret. Due to compulsory information
disclosure in case of patenting, the inventor faces a tradeoff between a positive
and a negative effect of patenting.
The positive effect can be isolated by calculating the difference between the
inventor’s profit with and without a patent, ignoring the effect of disclosure by
keeping γ > 0. By patenting the inventor is able to choose the higher quality
xPi , while with secrecy he realizes x
S




i . This defines
∆+ = Li(x
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as the positive effect of patenting. It is opposed by the negative effect of in-
formation disclosure. Technically speaking the technological headstart of the
inventor, γ, becomes zero whenever he patents. Consequently, as a rival is now
able to enter at an earlier point in time, tPj (x) = x instead of t
S
j (x) = x + γ,
the duration of the patent holder’s monopoly is narrowed. This negative patent
effect can be measured by the difference between the profit of the inventor with
and without a technological lead,
∆− = Li(x
P
i )|γ>0 − Li(x
P
i )|γ=0. (7)
Combining both effects yields ∆P = ∆
+ −∆−. Inserting equations (6) and (7)
this total patent effect can be derived as
∆P = Li(x
P
i )|γ=0 − Li(x
S
i )|γ>0. (8)
Whenever the total patent effect ∆P is positive, the positive overcompensates
the negative effect and the inventor has an incentive to patent.
< Insert figure 1 about here. >
Figure 1 depicts the total patent effect for broad patents. The intersection
point of the ∆P− curve with the x-axis defines a critical value of the techno-
logical lead, γP . For γ = γP the positive and the negative effect cancel each
other out. If the effective technological lead is small, γ < γP , the positive effect
dominates the negative effect and the inventor is better off with a patent. If
the technological lead exceeds the critical value γP the negative effect of disclo-
sure outweighs the positive effect so that the overall effect of patenting becomes
negative and the inventor prefers secrecy. Summarizing this gives us
Result 3. The patenting decision of the inventor depends on his technological
headstart. He will choose to
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(i) patent if his technological lead is small γ ≤ γP ,
(ii) keep his invention secret if his technological lead is high, γ > γP .
Increasing knowledge spillover λ increase the propensity to patent as the
effective technological lead, γ ≡ γ˜(1 − λ), declines in the absence of patent
protection. In figure 1 this corresponds to an upward shift of the ∆P− curve:
the negative effect of disclosure is weakened due to high knowledge spillover in
case of secrecy. This gives us




The results of the theoretical model are driven by three parameters: extent of
the technological lead, γ, knowledge spillover, λ, and strenght of a patent, φ.
The effect of knowledge spillover is linked to the technological lead: following
result 3 we suppose that the relation between the technological lead and the
propensity to patent is negative and state
Prediction 1. The higher the technological lead, the lower is an inventor’s
propensity to patent.
The theoretical model assumes that increasing knowledge spillover weaken
the alternative“secrecy”such that the propensity to patent will be high whenever
knowledge spillover, λ, are high (see result 4). This gives us
Prediction 2. The propensity to patent is high whenever an initial technological
lead is reduced by high knowledge spillover.
To translate these predictions into an estimation equation we come back to
the definition of the effective technological lead stated in the theoretical model:
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γ ≡ γ˜ − λγ˜,
which is included in the following estimation equation
P = β1 + β2TL+ β3KS + β4TL ∗KS + Controls, (9)
where P denotes the patenting decision, TL the (initial) technological lead
and KS knowledge spillover. In line with the theoretical findings, we conjecture
a negative influence of the technological lead (TL) and a positive effect of the
interaction term of TL and KS. As in the theoretical model spillover we expect
to find no significant effect of KS empirically.
The final prediction focuses on the impact on the threat of entry which is
subject to the breadth of a patent. Result 2 describes how a patent can mitigate
the threat of market entry. Using this finding we propose our final
Prediction 3. The threat of entry decreases with the breadth of a patent.
This translates into the following empirical model
TOE = β1 + β2TL+ β3KS + β4PB + Controls,
where TOE is the threat of entry and PB reflects patent breadth. As pre-
dicted by the theoretical model, patent breadth and technological lead should
have a negative effect on the perceived intensity of the threat of entry.
3.2. Data set and sample definition
The empirical analysis employs the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) of the
year 2005. The MIP is an annual survey which is conducted by the Centre for
European Economic Research (ZEW) Mannheim. Regularly – currently every
two years – the MIP is the German contribution to the Community Innovation
Survey (CIS). In 2005, the survey additionally contained an investigation of
firms’ perception of their competitive situation. To capture patent scope we
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merge patent information provided by the European Patent Office (EPO)3, by
condensing the EPO data to the firm level.4
In a next step we translate the theoretical assumptions into empirical terms:
the setting in which the model and its results are valid is one of innovative firms
and vertically differentiated products. In order to test our predictions, we re-
strict our sample to innovative firms, i.e., we exclude firms which did not launch
a new product or process within the period 2002 to 2004.5 Furthermore, we
only include firms with a competitive situation characterized by quality compe-
tition.6 Finally, as patents are the only legal protection measure requiring the
disclosure of the technological know-how embodied in an invention, we exclude
all other legal protection measures like trademarks from the sample and only
include firms which indicate that they either use patenting or secrecy (or both).
Our empirical analyses are based on 771 firms.
3.3. Variable definition and descriptive statistics
In the following, we describe the definition of our core variables: the inven-
tor’s patenting decision and competitors’ threat of entry. Table 2 provides an
overview of all variables, their descriptive statistics, and a short description.
To test predictions 1 and 2, we introduce the variable patenting which in-
dicates whether a firm uses patents to protect its intellectual property. In our
3The merge was conducted by Thorsten Doherr, ZEW, Mannheim, using a computer as-
sisted matching algorithm on the basis of firm names and addresses.
4We take all patent applications which have been filed by the sampled firms up to the
year 2003. We identified only few firms that stated to hold a patent in the MIP survey but
had no equivalent entry in the EPO data. Due to the missing information we dropped these
observations.
5Alternatively, we could look at firms conducting R&D. This group, however, would com-
prise a broad range of firms which is not in the focus of our theoretical model. Patenting is
only relevant for firms which have successfully completed the R&D process and are about to
launch the new product. R&D performing firms could also stand at the beginning of the R&D
process having a longer time before needing to decide how to protect their IP.
6In the 2005 survey, one question was included which refers to a characterization of the
competitive situation on the main product market as perceived by the questioned firm. The
firms were asked to rank the following choices according to their importance: quality, price,
technological advance, advertisement, product variety, flexibility towards customers. In our
sample, we keep all observations where firms indicated that quality is the most, second or
third most important feature of their competitive situation.
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data set, about 60% of the firms applied for a patent in the relevant period (see
table 2).
< Insert table 2 about here. >
The central variables of the propensity to patent estimation are technologi-
cal leadership and knowledge spillover. Both are not straightforward to imple-
ment empirically. Following the definition in the theoretical model, we define
technological leadership by the variable “temporal headstart over competitors”.
Respondents indicated whether the importance of a temporal headstart was
high, medium or low and our dummy variable indicates whether a respondent
chose high. Knowledge spillover may arise through different channels such as
absorptive capacity of competitors, easiness of reverse engineering, or techno-
logical proximity. If firms’ competitive environment is characterized by easy-
to-substitute products the relevance of the technology is high for competitors
in the same industry. Knowledge spillover takes unit value if a firm’s relevant
market is characterized by easy-to-substitute products to capture a high level of
spillover. From the theoretical model we know that the technological leadership
of a firm may be reduced by knowledge spillover. To implement this fact in our
empirical analysis we employ an interaction term (TL * KS ).7
Furthermore, we control for several factors that may influence innovation ac-
tivities, like firm size, human capital, R&D intensity, R&D cooperation, public
R&D subsidies and diversification, firm location (eastern Germany) and indus-
try affiliation according to NACE codes. We also reflect the structure and the
7The empirical translation of the theoretically identified core driving forces of the propen-
sity to patent is not perfect – particularly concerning knowledge spillover which we imple-
mented as the easiness of substitutability. Although a close relation between both concepts
exists in some circumstances this relation does not always hold, e.g. it is a valuable strategy for
competitors to find adequate substitutes for an innovative product if its imitation is blocked
by a patent (see e.g. Polidoro and Toh, 2011’s argumentation for the pharma industry). A
possible remedy for this limitation would be to use shifts in patent legislation influencing the
impact of disclosure requirements.
12
characteristics of a firm’s relevant market by controlling for the number of com-
petitors, the geographical dimension of the relevant market, characteristics of
the product life cycle (products become obsolete rapidly) and changes in pro-
duction technology.
Our second estimation tests prediction 3, i.e., the effect of patent breadth
on the threat of entry. We use a firm’s perception whether its market position
is threatened by the entry of new rivals, which is ranked on a 4-digit Likert
scale (fully applies, rather applies, hardly applies, does not apply). This ordered
variable is our indicator showing to what extent the effect of patent breadth
relates to the threat of market entry perceived by the inventor: we assume that
firms rank the threat of entry higher, the sooner a rival may be able to enter
the market. Thus, if a firm expects that the time until a rival enters is rather
short, it should rank the threat of entry higher than when it assumes that a
rival’s market entry will take place at a later point in time. For our measure
of patent breadth we follow Lerner (1994) and refer to the International Patent
Classification (IPC) codes. The classification codes relate a patent into specific
technology clusters which vary in their aggregational level. As a robustness
check for this measure, we use a firm’s average number of patent citations per
patent application.8
Table 1: International Patent Classification (IPC) Code of
the European Patent Office
Section Class Subclass Group
Main Group Subgroup
A 01 B 33/0 33/08
Lerner (1994) argues that patent scope can be captured by a variation of the
first four digits of the IPC codes assigned to a patent (see also Austin, 1993).
He used several alternative approaches to validate this implementation. His
8Patent breadth is often measured by (forward) patent citations (e.g. Hall et al., 2005,
Harhoff et al., 2003). The caveat of patent citations is that they evaluate patent breadth ex
post, making it necessary to use patent data of sufficient age.
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argumentation mainly built on a regression of the number of patent citations on
the number of variations in the assigned IPC codes; additionally, he conducted
interviews with 12 intellectual property attorneys. All validation procedures
revealed that patent scope can be appropriately implemented by variations in
IPC codes. For the empirical definition of narrow, broad and delaying patents,
we need a more detailed differentiation than that proposed in Lerner (1994).
In order to capture the different levels of patent scope we distinguish between
variations of IPC codes at the class, the subclass or the group level.9 The IPC
Guide gives a quite clear statement on the relation between the IPC code and
the scope of the respective patent.
The titles of sections, subsections and classes are only broadly in-
dicative of their content and do not define with precision the subject
matter falling under the general indication of the title. In general,
the section or subsection titles very loosely indicate the broad nature
of the scope of the subject matter to be found within the section or
subsection, and the class title gives an overall indication of the sub-
ject matter covered by its subclasses. By contrast, it is the intention
in the Classification that the titles of subclasses [...] define as pre-
cisely as possible the scope of the subject matter covered thereby. The
titles of main groups and subgroups [...] precisely define the subject
matter covered thereby [...]
(§68, IPC Guide)
In line with the above quote, since “the class title gives an overall indication
of the subject matter covered by its subclasses” and as variations at the sec-
tional level (including subsections), only “very loosely indicate the scope” of the
9To examine whether this distinction of variations in the IPC codes is an appropriate
measure for patent scope we used the regression-based robustness check implemented by Lerner
(1994). We use patent data from 1995 and its citations up to 2005 to escape the problem of
recentness. Our Poisson regressions reveal two significant effects: A strongly positive effect of
our delaying patent indicator and a negative effect for the indicator of narrow patents.
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respective patent, we define narrow, broad and delaying patents starting with
variations at the class level. Whenever a classification symbol differs on the level
of classes or subclasses, we characterize the respective patent as delaying. We
define a patent as broad if the IPC codes vary in groups and as narrow if the
IPC codes differ in subgroups. Additionally, all patents with a single IPC code
are classified as narrow patents. For every firm we count all delaying, broad
and narrow patents and divide them by the number of employees as we assume
that larger firms tend to have larger patent portfolios. For further robustness
checks, we move the borders of each category.
Again, we control for several factors that may influence our dependent vari-
ables. Most of the control variables coincide with those of the propensity to
patent–estimation. We further include capital intensity as a measure of market
entry barriers and an indicator for market novelty.
3.4. Empirical results
Predictions 1 and 2
To test predictions 1 and 2 we estimate a probit model with robust standard
errors and display marginal effects evaluated at the sample means with standard
errors calculated using the delta method. The estimation includes an interaction
term of technological lead and knowledge spillover to test prediction 2. We
calculate its marginal effect using the method proposed by Ai and Norton (2003)
and present a graphical analysis of its marginal effects as suggested by Hoetker
(2007) referring to the continuous nature of the technological lead.
In our theoretical model, patenting and secrecy are mutually exclusive pro-
tection strategies. In contrast to this theoretical construct, many survey firms
state the use of both, patents and secrecy. There are several explanations for
this observation, e.g., firms may conduct several innovation projects which they
protect by different means. Alternatively, only parts of an invention may be
patented, especially those which may be re-engineered easily, or specific compo-
nents of the invention are not patentable. In this case both, patents and secrecy,
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protect the same invention at the same time. Following these arguments patent-
ing and secrecy should not be seen as exclusive protection strategies. To take
this into account, we define a new dependent variable and estimate a multino-




0 if patent = 0 & secrecy = 1
1 if patent = 1 & secrecy = 0
2 if patent = 1 & secrecy = 1
with the base outcome 0.11 As, again, the interplay of technological lead
and knowledge spillover and its relation to the propensity to patent is a crucial
part of the investigation, we analyze the interplay graphically in figure 3.
The theoretical model assumes that firms only conduct one innovation project.
The empirical data, however, only allow us to analyze the firm level. To account
for this we include a robustness check estimating the empirical models with a
sample including only firms with less than 250 employees. In this reduced sam-
ple, firms should only have one (or only few) innovative product(s).12 The
estimation results of the probit and the multinomial logit can be found in table
3 and in figures 2 and 3.
In line with prediction 1, our empirical results display a negative sign of the
respective marginal effect, whereas the overall effect of the technological lead
10When defining the estimation sample we explicitly excluded firms which stated that they
use neither patenting nor secrecy to protect their innovative product. This is the reason why
category “patent=0 & secrecy=0” does not exist.
11Note that for the probit “patent”= 1 if “patent secrecy”= 1, 2
12We acknowledge that this robustness check can only be interpreted as an indicator for
one-innovation firms. However, we are confident that the test is of relevance, as the emergence
of multiple innovation projects should be positively correlated with firm size. Furthermore, we
presume that small firms conduct research in technologically related areas meaning that their
protection strategies as well as the respective competitive environments are most likely similar.
To better reflect a one-innovation firm, information on specific innovation projects and the
related protection strategies would be essential. This would allow for a deeper understanding
of the role of knowledge spillover for the patenting decision and the effect of patent breadth
on the threat of entry. Note that reducing the sample to small firms does not mean that the
contemporaneous use of patenting and secrecy decreases. As pointed out earlier the choice of
a protection mechanism rather depends on technology than on firm size.
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turns out to be insignificant.13 Taking into account the fact that firms’ intel-
lectual property protection strategies possibly involve the combination of both
protective measures, the results of the multinomial logit in table 3 allow us to
draw a more accurate picture. Regarding the technological lead the multinomial
logit reveals that using patenting as the only protection mechanism for inno-
vative products is indeed negatively linked to the technological lead, whereas a
positive relation is found for the contemporaneous use of patenting and secrecy.
Both results are relative to the base category of choosing only secrecy. This
finding is in line with prediction 1 and further supports earlier results suggest-
ing that firms only patent and disclose that part of an invention, which can
most easily be re-engineered and thereby try to omit the disclosure of essential
know-how in their patents (see Hall and Harhoff, 2012).
< Insert table 3 about here. >
To test prediction 2 we introduce an interaction term of technological lead
and knowledge spillover (TL ∗KS) and analyze its relation to the propensity to
patent. Our findings support the prediction: for the probit estimation, figure 2
shows graphically that in industries characterized by high knowledge spillover,
the relation between technological lead and the propensity to patent is posi-
tive. Figure 3 displays the results for the interaction term in the multinomial
logit setting. We see that the alternative of protecting intellectual property
only by patents relative to the alternative of only choosing secrecy exhibits no
difference between firms in industries characterized by high or low knowledge
spillover. Thus, the effect of the interaction term is dominated by the negative
13A first tentative explanation for this finding could be that the theoretical model disregards
several mandatory patentability requirements, e.g. a sufficiently high inventive step. Thus,
while the model predicts that the propensity to patent is high whenever the technological
lead is small, it actually may be the case that the technological headstart leading to a patent
in theoretical terms, is de facto not eligible for patent protection empirically as it does not
incorporate a sufficient inventive step.
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link between technological lead and the propensity to use only patents. The
multinomial logit accounts for a strategy mix, i.e., the contemporaneous use
of patenting and secrecy to protect newly generated knowledge. From figure
3 we can deduce that high knowledge spillover and an increasing technological
lead positively influence the joint use of patenting and secrecy. Finally, as pre-
dicted by the theoretical model, appropriability itself displays no statistically
significant relation with the propensity to patent in all variants of the empirical
test.
< Insert figure 2 about here. >
< Insert figure 3 about here. >
As a robustness check, we look at the reduced sample of firms with a max-
imum of 250 employees. We can confirm that our results also hold for this
reduced sample. Assuming that these firms rather meet the theoretical assump-
tion of one-product firms we are able to interpret our results as follows: in line
with prediction 1 and 2, firms display a higher propensity to patent in situations
in which their technological lead is low. A high technological lead may be asso-
ciated with an increasing attractiveness of secrecy or a mixture of patenting and
secrecy. Particularly, in environments in which the technological lead may be
largely reduced by knowledge spillover, firms may opt for a mixture of patenting
and secrecy as the relation between the propensity to use patenting and secrecy
and the interaction term is significantly positive compared to the propensity to
only use secrecy.
Turning to the control variables our results are in line with stylized facts:
the patenting behavior of firms as well as the joint use of patenting and se-
crecy is positively linked to the size of a firm, to its R&D intensity, to R&D
subsidies as well as to the engagement of a firm in R&D cooperations. Interest-
ingly, the control variables reflecting the strength of competition with respect to
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competitors, customers and regional dimensions are mainly insignificant. One
exception is a significantly positive relation with non EU . A possible explana-
tion for this result is that firms which are inter alia active in non-EU markets
tend to rate protection in their home-market as more important than firms op-
erating solely in the German home-market. This effect may prevail due to the
fact that those firms fear the entry of foreign firms with substitute products.
Further, we find that R&D cooperation has a significantly positive link to the
propensity to patent, whereas being located in Eastern Germany has a nega-
tive effect. Generally, empirical evidence based on firm-level surveys finds that
the propensity to patent varies by industry sectors. Our industry dummies are
jointly significant hinting at such structural differences between industry sectors.
Prediction 3
We test the effect of patent breadth on the threat of entry by estimating an
ordered probit with robust standard errors for the threat of entry. As before,
marginal effects of the estimation are evaluated at the samples means and the
respective standard errors are obtained using the delta method. Patent breadth
is implemented as described in Section 3.3. As market structure and character-
istics are endogenous, we first estimate a basic model ignoring the specificities of
the relevant market and then stepwise include the technology dimension of the
relevant market and the competitive side. Furthermore, we conduct robustness
checks (i) estimating the model with a reduced sample of firms with not more
than 250 employees, (ii) altering the definition of patent breadth, and (iii) us-
ing alternative measures for patent breadth. The results including all robustness
checks are displayed in tables 4 and 5.
Table 4 shows the results of the ordered probit for the estimation of the
threat of entry on patent breadth. The findings are robust to variations (i)−(iii)
and confirm that broader patents (reflected by the number of delaying patents
per 100 employees) are negatively related to the threat of entry. This finding
supports prediction 3.
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< Insert table 4 about here. >
For robustness check (ii) (see table 5), we first moved the somewhat arbitrary
separation of delaying and broad patents to the left so that delaying patents are
defined as patents with varying IPC codes at the level of Sections and Classes.
Broad patents are then defined by variations in Subclasses and Main Groups.
Second, using this new border between delaying and broad patents we varied
the border between broad and narrow patents between Subclasses and Main
Groups. All variations in the definition of delaying, broad and narrow patents
do not alter the previous results. The final robustness check (iii) using the
number of forward citations per patent application as a measure for patent
scope and additionally accounting for the number of patent applications per
100 employees shows that even using alternative measures of patent scope does
not change our results as we find a negative link between citations and the threat
of entry. Summarizing we conclude that empirical evidence supports prediction
3, i.e., broader patents lead to a delayed market entry of competitors.
< Insert table 5 about here. >
In contrast to the theoretical conjecture, we find no significant link of the
threat of entry with technological lead. Nevertheless, a positive relation with
knowledge spillover is apparent. This is relatively intuitive as competitors ben-
efit from the spillover. A positive relation can also be confirmed for quickly
changing technologies and the number of firms in a market.
4. Conclusion
This paper provides theoretical and empirical evidence regarding the interplay
of technological leadership, patent breadth and the threat of market entry. We
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analyze a technology leader’s decision to patent in the context of his competitive
environment. Given varying breadth of patent protection, we find that broader
patents mitigate the perceived threat of market entry. The first part of the paper
sketches a theoretical model (Zaby, 2009) from which we draw our predictions
which are tested in the second part.
We condense the theoretical results into three predictions reflecting the ef-
fects of patenting. Predictions 1 and 2 refer to the effects of compulsory informa-
tion disclosure: the fear of losing a large technological lead by patenting reduces
the propensity to patent, while in industries with high knowledge spillover large
technological advances are patented. Prediction 3 states that increasing patent
breadth decreases the threat of market entry.
Predictions 1 and 2 are tested using a probit model of the decision patent
vs secrecy. As empirical evidence suggests that patenting and secrecy are not
mutually exclusive we extend the analysis to a multinomial logit accounting for
three different protection strategies: the sole use of secrecy (patents) or the joint
use of patenting and secrecy. The multinomial logit provides an explanation why
the probit estimation does not support prediction 1: while the technological lead
is negatively related to the propensity to use only patenting, the joint use of
patenting and secrecy turns out to be positively related to the technological
lead. Both results support prediction 1. Both estimations – the probit and the
multinomial logit – also provide evidence supporting prediction 2. The probit
result – that a technological lead is positively related to the propensity to patent
– is confirmed by the multinomial logit for the mixed protection strategy. If
firms opt for patents as exclusive protective measure the link is reversed. The
multinomial logit results thus allow us to draw a more detailed picture of how
technology leaders protect their technological advancements.
Because the threat of entry is measured on a four-digit Likert scale, we
use an ordered probit estimation to analyze prediction 3. We interpret a lower
threat of entry as an indicator that potential competitors postpone their market
entry. To implement the differences in patent breadth we extend the approach
of Lerner (1994) using variations in IPC codes. To test the robustness of our
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new measure we vary the definition of patent breadth. An alternative measure
based on forward citations which confirm prediction 3.
Aside from the advancement of Lerner’s measure for patent scope one con-
tribution is the containment of a stylized fact: the common economic intuition
that the propensity to patent is higher, the larger the technological advance an
innovation embodies, actually only holds in industry sectors with high knowl-
edge spillover. Thus we have“big patents and little secrets”with high, but“little
patents and big secrets” with low knowledge spillover. Further, we show that
patent breadth indeed mitigates the threat of market entry.
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Figure 2: Relation of the propensity to patent with varying technological lead for different
levels of knowledge spillover – probit estimation
Source: MIP 2005, authors’ calculations.
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Figure 3: Relation of the patenting and secrecy with varying technological lead for different
levels of knowledge spillover – multinomial logit estiamtion
Source: MIP 2005, authors’ calculations.
Note: Average predictions for multinomial logit. We look at two different levels of KS: 0 and 1.
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Tables
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Description
patent 0.599 0.490 0 1 Patent application between 2002 and
2004
secrecy 0.885 0.320 0 1 Trade secrecy to protect innovation be-
tween 2002 and 2004
technological lead 0.594 0.491 0 1 Temporal headstart over competitors
highly important
knowledge spillover 0.682 0.466 0 1 easy-to-substitute products in main mar-
ket fully or rather applies
log(employees) 4.577 1.696 0.693 9.152 Number of employees in 2002
human capital 0.263 0.264 0.000 1.000 Share of employees holding a university
degree in 2002
R&D intensity 0.062 0.116 0.00 0.792 Expenditures for in-house R&D per sales
in 2003
cooperation 0.455 0.498 0 1 Research cooperation with competitors,
customers, universities
diversification 0.657 0.244 0 1 sales share generatedby three most im-
portant customers
subsidy 0.418 0.493 0 1 Public subsidies
large no. of firms 0.134 0.340 0 1 More than 15 competitors in main market
medium no. of firms 0.204 0.403 0 1 Between 6 and 15 competitors in main
market
product old 0.091 0.287 0 1 competitive environment: products
rapidly obsolete (fully applies)
tech. obsolete 0.466 0.499 0 1 competitive environment: technologies
change quickly (fully and rather applies)
EU 0.676 0.468 0 1 Main product market: EU without
Germany
non EU 0.489 0.500 0 1 main product market: outside EU
east 0.284 0.451 0 1 Firm located in eastern Germany
threat of entry 1.455 0.767 0 3 Market position threatened by entry
(3=applies)
capital intensity 0.089 0.144 0.000 1.575 Tangible assets per employee in 2002
market novelty 0.615 0.487 0 1 Market novelty introduced XXX
delaying 0.171 0.572 0.000 4.505 No. of patents with delaying scope (per
100 employees)
broad 0.028 0.121 0.000 1.066 No. of patents with large scope (per 100
employees)
narrow 0.062 0.237 0.000 2.041 No. of patents with small scope (per 100
employees)
citations 0.312 0.634 0.000 3.333 No. of citations per patent
patent stock 0.564 1.600 0.000 13.993 Patent stock per 100 employees
PAT = 1, SEC = 0 11.5%
PAT = 1, SEC = 1 48.4%
PAT = 0, SEC = 1 40.1%
PAT = 0, SEC = 0 00.0%
No. of observations 771
Notes: The 11 industries we control for are ind1: Agriculture, Food, Textile; ind2: Mining, Coke, Fuel,
Electricity; ind3: Wood, Paper, Publishing, Printing, Furniture, Recycling; ind4: Chemicals, Plastics,
Glass; ind5: Metals; ind6: Machinery, Motor Vehicle without Aerospace; ind7: Office Machinery; ind8:
Precision Instruments, Aerospace; ind9: Telecommunication and Computer Services; ind10: R&D ser-
vices; and ind11: Consumer-related Services like hotels, gastronomy.
Table 3: Results of the Patenting Decision Estimation
all firms firms with ≤ 250
Probit Multinomial Logit Probit Multinomial Logit
PAT=1,SEC=0 PAT=1,SEC=1 PAT=1,SEC=0 PAT=1,SEC=1
Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff.
(Std. Err) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
technological lead -0.071 -.060*** 0.122*** -0.011 -0.033*** 0.098*
(0.060) (0.015) (0.046) (0.050) (0.011) (0.052)
knowledge spillover -0.053 0.012 -0.010 -0.018 0.003 -0.018
(0.061) (0.012) (0.051) (0.051) (0.009) (0.056)
TL * KS 0.124* 0.130
(0.070) (0.085)
log(employees) 0.061*** -0.002 0.104*** 0.072*** 0.001 0.080***
(0.011) (0.004) (0.017) (0.024) (0.003) (0.026)
human capital 0.095 -0.051 0.239* -0.017 -0.027 0.033
(0.085) (0.033) (0.134) (0.125) (0.023) (0.139)
R&D intensity 0.667*** 0.169*** 0.993*** 1.029*** 0.120*** 0.986***
(0.156) (0.049) (0.337) (0.291) (0.032) (0.333)
cooperation 0.077* -0.014 0.130** 0.087 -0.008 0.123**
(0.040) (0.013) (0.052) (0.059) (0.010) (0.062)
diversification -0.134** -0.021 -0.139 -0.209** -0.023 -0.164
(0.065) (0.020) (0.093) (0.103) (0.014) (0.113)
subsidy 0.074* -0.000 0.113** 0.107* 0.000 0.116*
(0.040) (0.013) (0.056) (0.061) (0.010) (0.064)
large no. of firms -0.067 -0.024 0.031 -0.097 -0.010 -0.058
(0.048) (0.018) (0.074) (0.076) (0.012) (0.086)
medium no. of firms -0.011 0.004 -0.017 -0.008 0.003 -0.015
(0.042) (0.013) (0.061) (0.063) (0.009) (0.071)
product old 0.012 -0.045 0.056 0.001 -0.039 0.066
(0.056) (0.032) (0.081) (0.084) (0.024) (0.088)
tech. obsolete -0.049 -0.014 -0.042 -0.101** -0.011 -0.082
(0.032) (0.011) (0.047) (0.049) (0.008) (0.055)
EU 0.026 0.012 0.003 -0.023 0.001 -0.035
(0.043) (0.014) (0.058) (0.059) (0.009) (0.064)
non EU 0.104*** 0.003 0.132*** 0.152*** 0.007 0.149**
(0.038) (0.011) (0.050) (0.055) (0.008) (0.060)
east -0.093** 0.007 -0.149** -0.064 -0.003 -0.060
(0.039) (0.012) (0.058) (0.054) (0.008) (0.060)
industry dummies included included included included
Log likelihood -394.35 -573.20 -305.45 -418.56
McFadden’s adjusted R2 0.240 0.231 0.176 0.189
χ2(all) 194.97*** 2909.62*** 113.11*** 3061.68***
χ2(ind) 31.26*** 1066.02*** 13.69 2015.12***
No. of observations 771 771 535 535
*** (**, *) indicate significance of 1 % (5 %, 10 %) respectively.
Notes: This table depicts the marginal effects of the probit estimations regarding the determinants of the patenting decision and of the
multinomial logit model. Marginal effects are calculated at the sample means. The marginal effect of the probit’s interaction term is ob-
tained according to Ai and Norton (2003) and analyzes graphically (see Figures 2 and 3). Standard errors are calculated with the delta
method.
The definition of the industry dummies can be found in the notes of Table 2.
χ2(all) displays a test on the joint significance of all variables.
χ2(ind) displays a test on the joint significance of the industry dummies.
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Table 4: Ordered Probit for Threat of Entry Estimation
Basic Model Technology Competition Firms with ≤ 250
threat strong medium weak no strong medium weak no strong medium weak no strong medium weak no
delaying -0.034** -0.047** 0.051** 0.030** -0.035** -0.048** 0.052** 0.031** -0.029** -0.040** 0.043** 0.026** -0.033** -0.049** 0.056** 0.026**
(0.015) (0.020) (0.023) (0.012) (0.015) (0.020) (0.022) (0.010) (0.014) (0.019) (0.021) (0.012) (0.016) (0.022) (0.026) (0.011)
broad 0.022 0.030 -0.032 -0.019 0.039 0.054 -0.059 -0.035 0.049 0.068 -0.074 -0.044 0.053 0.078 -0.090 -0.041
(0.061) (0.085) (0.092) (0.054) (0.058) (0.087) (0.086) (0.052) (0.053) (0.075) (0.080) (0.048) (0.087) (0.131) (0.149) (0.069)
narrow 0.020 0.028 -0.031 -0.018 0.003 0.036 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 0.005 0.002
(0.048) (0.066) (0.072) (0.042) (0.047) (0.065) (0.070) (0.041) (0.044) (0.061) (0.066) (0.039) (0.069) (0.102) (0.118) (0.054)
tech. lead 0.007 0.010 -0.011 -0.007 0.006 0.007 -0.007 -0.004 0.006 0.009 -0.009 -0.006 0.004 0.006 -0.007 -0.003
(0.016) (0.023) (0.025) (0.015) (0.016) (0.023) (0.025) (0.014) (0.016) (0.022) (0.024) (0.014) (0.019) (0.028) (0.032) (0.015)
spillover 0.053*** 0.073*** -0.079*** -0.046*** 0.059*** 0.082*** -0.089*** -0.056*** 0.078*** 0.078*** -0.084*** -0.050*** 0.052** 0.077*** -0.088*** -0.040**
(0.018) (0.022) (0.025) (0.015) (0.018) (0.023) (0.025) (0.016) (0.018) (0.022) (0.025) (0.016) (0.020) (0.027) (0.032) (0.016)
log(emp.) 0.004 0.006 -0.006 -0.004 0.007 0.005 -0.007 -0.004 0.003 0.004 -0.004 -0.002 0.011 0.017 -0.019 -0.009
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.007)
cap. intensity -0.050 -0.069 0.075 0.044 -0.033 -0.045 0.049 0.029 -0.029 -0.040 0.043 0.025 -0.045 -0.067 0.077 0.035
(0.055) (0.077) (0.083) (0.048) (0.055) (0.076) (0.083) (0.048) (0.053) (0.075) (0.081) (0.048) (0.096) (0.141) (0.163) (0.074)
cooperation -0.020 -0.028 0.030 0.018 -0.019 -0.027 0.029 0.017 -0.011 -0.016 0.017 0.010 -0.027 -0.040 0.047 0.021
(0.016) (0.022) (0.024) (0.014) (0.016) (0.021) (0.023) (0.014) (0.015) (0.021) (0.023) (0.014) (0.019) (0.027) (0.032) (0.015)
market novelty -0.024 -0.036 0.040 0.023 -0.021 -0.030 0.030 0.021 -0.022 -0.030 0.033 0.019 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.017) (0.023) (0.025) (0.015) (0.017) (0.024) (0.023) (0.015) (0.017) (0.024) (0.025) (0.015) (0.020) (0.030) (0.035) (0.016)
diversification 0.023 0.032 -0.034 -0.020 0.025 0.033 -0.037 -0.022 0.025 0.034 -0.037 -0.022 0.028 0.042 -0.048 -0.022
(0.033) (0.045) (0.049) (0.028) (0.033) (0.024) (0.049) (0.028) (0.032) (0.044) (0.048) (0.028) (0.037) (0.053) (0.061) (0.028)
large # of firms 0.052** 0.072** -0.078** -0.046** 0.045 0.067 -0.077 -0.035
(0.025) (0.033) (0.037) (0.022) (0.030) (0.043) (0.051) (0.023)
med. # of firms 0.066*** 0.092*** -0.099*** -0.059*** 0.058** 0.086*** -0.099*** -0.045**
(0.020) (0.026) (0.029) (0.018) (0.023) (0.032) (0.037) (0.018)
product old 0.036 0.050 -0.055 -0.032 0.039 0.055 -0.059 -0.035 0.022 0.032 -0.037 -0.017
(0.024) (0.034) (0.036) (0.022) (0.024) (0.034) (0.036) (0.022) (0.025) (0.038) (0.043) (0.020)
tech. obsolete 0.056*** 0.078*** -0.085*** -0.049*** 0.056*** 0.078*** -0.085*** -0.050*** 0.052** 0.077*** -0.088*** -0.040**
(0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.015) (0.020) (0.028) (0.032) (0.017)
EU -0.008 -0.11 0.012 0.007 -0.011 -0.016 0.019 0.009
(0.021) (0.028) (0.031) (0.018) (0.023) (0.033) (0.038) (0.017)
non EU -0.006 -0.009 0.010 0.006 0.003 0.004 -0.004 -0.002
(0.018) (0.025) (0.027) (0.016) (0.021) (0.030) (0.035) (0.016)
east 0.021 0.028 -0.031 -0.018 0.017 0.023 -0.025 -0.015 0.010 0.014 -0.015 -0.009 0.014 0.021 -0.024 -0.011
(0.017) (0.024) (0.025) (0.015) (0.017) (0.024) (0.026) (0.015) (0.017) (0.024) (0.025) (0.015) (0.018) (0.027) (0.030) (0.014)
industries included included included included
Log likelihood -571.82 -563.72 -556.33 -369.05
Adj. R2 0.032 0.045 0.058 0.054
χ2(all) 40.16*** 60.99*** 80.99*** 48.48***
χ2(ind) 13.78 14.73 17.16* 10.43
No. of obs. 527 527 527 360
*** (**, *) indicate significance of 1 % (5 %, 10 %) respectively.
This table depicts marginal effects for an ordered probit for the estimation of threat of entry. Marginal effects are calculated at the sample means and standard errors are calculated with the delta method. The effect of the
interaction term is included in the overall effects of its components technologicallead and knowledgespillover.
Adj. R2 is equivalent to McFadden’s adj. R2.
χ2(all) displays a test on the joint significance of all variables.
χ2(ind) displays a test on the joint significance of the industry dummies.
Table 5: Ordered Probit for Threat of Entry Estimation – Robustness Checks
new delaying def. new broad def. Citations
threat strong medium weak no strong medium weak no strong medium weak no
delaying -0.029** -0.040** 0.043** 0.025** -0.030** -0.041** 0.045** 0.026**
(0.014) (0.019) (0.021) (0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.021) (0.012)
broad 0.025 0.035 -0.037 -0.022 -0.018 -0.024 0.026 0.016
(0.044) (0.062) (0.066) (0.040) (0.087) (0.120) (0.130) (0.077)
narrow -0.004 -0.006 0.007 0.004 0.016 0.023 -0.024 -0.014
(0.046) (0.063) (0.068) (0.041) (0.029) (0.041) (0.044) (0.026)
citations -0.025* -0.034* 0.037* 0.022*
(0.014) (0.018) (0.020) (0.012)
patent stock 0.160 0.215 -0.233 -0.142
(0.429) (0.577) (0.623) (0.383)
technological lead 0.006 0.009 -0.010 -0.006 0.007 0.009 -0.010 -0.006 0.007 0.013 -0.010 -0.010
(0.016) (0.022) (0.024) (0.014) (0.016) (0.022) (0.024) (0.014) (0.016) (0.022) (0.023) (0.016)
knowledge spillover 0.056*** 0.078*** -0.084*** -0.050*** 0.056*** 0.077*** -0.084*** -0.050*** 0.055*** 0.086*** -0.082*** -0.059***
(0.018) (0.023) (0.025) (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.025) (0.016) (0.015) (0.024) (0.021) (0.018)
log(employees) 0.003 0.004 -0.004 -0.002 0.003 0.004 -0.004 -0.002 0.005 0.007 -0.007 -0.004
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005)
capital intensity -0.028 -0.039 0.042 0.025 -0.029 -0.041 0.044 0.026 -0.028 -0.038 0.041 0.025
(0.053) (0.075) (0.080) (0.048) (0.053) (0.075) (0.081) (0.048) (0.054) (0.073) (0.078) (0.048)
cooperation -0.012 -0.017 0.018 0.011 -0.009 -0.017 0.018 0.011 -0.014 -0.019 0.020 0.012
(0.015) (0.021) (0.023) (0.014) (0.015) (0.021) (0.023) (0.014) (0.016) (0.021) (0.022) (0.014)
market novelty -0.022 -0.030 0.033 0.019 -0.012 -0.031 0.033 0.020 -0.017 -0.022 0.024 0.015
(0.017) (0.024) (0.025) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.025) (0.015) (0.017) (0.023) (0.025) (0.015)
diversification 0.024 0.034 -0.037 -0.022 0.025 0.035 -0.037 -0.022 0.021 0.028 -0.030 -0.018
(0.032) (0.044) (0.048) (0.028) (0.032) (0.044) (0.048) (0.028) (0.032) (0.043) (0.046) (0.028)
large no. of firms 0.052** 0.072** -0.078** -0.046** 0.051** 0.072** -0.077** -0.046** 0.048* 0.064** -0.070** -0.043*
(0.025) (0.033) (0.037) (0.022) (0.025) (0.033) (0.037) (0.022) (0.025) (0.032) (0.036) (0.022)
medium no. of firms 0.066*** 0.092*** -0.099*** -0.059*** 0.066*** 0.092*** -0.099*** -0.059*** 0.055*** 0.075*** -0.081*** -0.049***
(0.020) (0.026) (0.029) (0.018) (0.020) (0.026) (0.029) (0.018) (0.020) (0.026) (0.028) (0.018)
product old 0.040* 0.055 -0.060* -0.035 0.040* 0.056 -0.060* -0.036 0.037 0.050 -0.054 -0.033
(0.024) (0.034) (0.036) (0.022) (0.024) (0.034) (0.036) (0.022) (0.023) (0.031) (0.033) (0.021)
tech. obsolete 0.056*** 0.078*** -0.085*** -0.050*** 0.056*** 0.077*** -0.084*** -0.050*** 0.057*** 0.077*** -0.083*** -0.051***
(0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.023) (0.016)
EU -0.008 -0.011 0.011 0.007 -0.007 -0.011 0.012 0.007 -0.008 -0.010 0.011 0.007
(0.021) (0.028) (0.031) (0.018) (0.021) (0.028) (0.031) (0.018) (0.021) (0.028) (0.030) (0.019)
non EU -0.007 -0.009 0.010 0.006 -0.008 -0.009 0.009 0.006 -0.015 -0.020 0.022 0.013
(0.018) (0.025) (0.027) (0.016) (0.021) (0.025) (0.027) (0.016) (0.018) (0.024) (0.026) (0.016)
east 0.011 0.015 -0.016 -0.009 0.010 0.013 -0.014 -0.009 0.006 0.008 -0.009 -0.005
(0.017) (0.024) (0.026) (0.015) (0.017) (0.024) (0.025) (0.015) (0.017) (0.023) (0.025) (0.016)
industry dummies included included included
Log likelihood -556.42 -556.42 -572.28
McFadden’s adjusted R2 0.058 0.058 0.055
χ2(all) 79.10*** 80.42*** 73.15***
χ2(ind) 17.03* 17.09*
No. of observations 527 527 539
*** (**, *) indicate significance of 1 % (5 %, 10 %) respectively.
This table depicts marginal effects for an ordered probit for the estimation of threat of entry. Marginal effects are calculated at the sample means and standard errors are
calculated with the delta method. The effect of the interaction term is included in the overall effects of its components technologicallead and knowledgespillover.
χ2(all) displays a test on the joint significance of all variables.
χ2(ind) displays a test on the joint significance of the industry dummies.
